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Abstract
Quorum systems are a key abstraction in distributed fault-tolerant computing for capturing trust as-
sumptions. They can be found at the core of many algorithms for implementing reliable broadcasts,
shared memory, consensus and other problems. This paper introduces asymmetric Byzantine quorum
systems that model subjective trust. Every process is free to choose which combinations of other pro-
cesses it trusts and which ones it considers faulty. Asymmetric quorum systems strictly generalize
standard Byzantine quorum systems, which have only one global trust assumption for all processes.
This work also presents protocols that implement abstractions of shared memory and broadcast prim-
itives with processes prone to Byzantine faults and asymmetric trust. The model and protocols pave
the way for realizing more elaborate algorithms with asymmetric trust.
1 Introduction
Byzantine quorum systems [19] are a fundamental primitive for building resilient distributed systems
from untrusted components. Given a set of nodes, a quorum system captures a trust assumption on the
nodes in terms of potentially malicious protocol participants and colluding groups of nodes. Based on
quorum systems, many well-known algorithms for reliable broadcast, shared memory, consensus and
more have been implemented; these are the main abstractions to synchronize the correct nodes with each
other and to achieve consistency despite the actions of the faulty, so-called Byzantine nodes.
Traditionally, trust in a Byzantine quorum system for a set of processes P has been symmetric. In
other words, a global assumption specifies which processes may fail, such as the simple and prominent
threshold quorum assumption, in which any subset of P of a given maximum size may collude and act
against the protocol. The most basic threshold Byzantine quorum system, for example, allows all subsets
of up to f < n/3 processes to fail. Some classic works also model arbitrary, non-threshold symmetric
quorum systems [19, 15], but these have not actually been used in practice.
However, trust is inherently subjective. De gustibus non est disputandum. Estimating which pro-
cesses will function correctly and which ones will misbehave may depend on personal taste. A myriad
of local choices influences one process’ trust in others, especially because there are so many forms of
“malicious” behavior. Some processes might not even be aware of all others, yet a process should not
depend on unknown third parties in a distributed collaboration. How can one model asymmetric trust
in distributed protocols? Can traditional Byzantine quorum systems be extended to subjective failure
assumptions? How do the standard protocols generalize to this model?
In this paper, we answer these questions and introduce models and protocols for asymmetric dis-
tributed trust. We formalize asymmetric quorum systems for asynchronous protocols, in which every
process can make its own assumptions about Byzantine faults of others. We introduce several protocols
with asymmetric trust that strictly generalize the existing algorithms, which require common trust.
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Our formalization takes up earlier work by Damga˚rd et al. [10] and starts out with the notion of a
fail-prone system that forms the basis of a symmetric Byzantine quorum system. A global fail-prone
system for a process set P contains all maximal subsets of P that might jointly fail during an execution.
In an asymmetric quorum system, every process specifies its own fail-prone system and a corresponding
set of local quorums. These local quorum systems satisfy a consistency condition that ranges across
all processes and a local availability condition, and generalize symmetric Byzantine quorum system
according to Malkhi and Reiter [19].
Interest in consensus protocols based on Byzantine quorum systems has surged recently because
of their application to permissioned blockchain networks [6, 2]. Typically run by a consortium, such
distributed ledgers often use Byzantine-fault tolerant (BFT) protocols like PBFT [7] for consensus that
rely on symmetric threshold quorum systems. The Bitcoin blockchain and many other cryptocurrencies,
which triggered this development, started from different assumptions and use so-called permissionless
protocols, in which everyone may participate. Those algorithms capture the relative influence of the
participants on consensus decisions by an external factor, such as “proof-of-work” or “proof-of-stake.”
A middle ground between permissionless blockchains and BFT-based ones has been introduced
by the blockchain networks of Ripple (https://ripple.com) and Stellar (https://stellar.
org). Their stated model for achieving network-level consensus uses subjective trust in the sense that
each process declares a local list of processes that it “trusts” in the protocol.
Consensus in the Ripple blockchain (and for the XRP cryptocurrency on the XRP Ledger) is executed
by its validator nodes. Each validator declares a Unique Node List (UNL), which is a “list of transaction
validators a given participant believes will not conspire to defraud them;” but on the other hand, “Ripple
provides a default and recommended list which we expand based on watching the history of validators
operated by Ripple and third parties” [23]. Many questions have therefore been raised about the kind of
decentralization offered by the Ripple protocol. This debate has not yet been resolved.
Stellar was created as an evolution of Ripple that shares much of the same design philosophy. The
Stellar consensus protocol [20] powers the Stellar Lumen (XLM) cryptocurrency and introduces federated
Byzantine quorum systems (FBQS); these bear superficial resemblance with our asymmetric quorum
systems but differ technically. Stellar’s consensus protocol uses quorum slices, which are “the subset
of a quorum that can convince one particular node of agreement.” In an FBQS, “each node chooses its
own quorum slices” and “the system-wide quorums result from these decisions by individual nodes” [26].
However, standard Byzantine quorum systems and FBQS are not comparable because (1) an FBQS when
instantiated with the same trust assumption for all processes does not reduce to a symmetric quorum
system and (2) existing protocols do not generalize to FBQS.
Understanding how such ideas of subjective trust, as manifested in the Ripple and Stellar blockchains,
relate to traditional quorum systems is the main motivation for this work. Our protocols for asymmetric
trust generalize the well-known, classic algorithms in the literature and therefore look superficially sim-
ilar. This should be seen as a feature, actually, because simplicity and modularity are important guiding
principles in science.
Our contributions are as follows:
• We introduce asymmetric Byzantine quorum systems formally in Section 4 as an extension of
standard Byzantine quorum systems and discuss some of their properties.
• In Section 5, we show two implementations of a shared register, with single-writer, multi-reader
regular semantics, using asymmetric Byzantine quorum systems.
• We examine broadcast primitives in the Byzantine model with asymmetric trust in Section 6. In
particular, we define and implement Byzantine consistent and reliable broadcast protocols. The
latter primitive is related to a “federated voting” protocol used by Stellar consensus [20].
Before presenting the technical contributions, we discuss related work in Section 2 and state our system
model in Section 3.
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2 Related work
Damga˚rd et al. [10] introduce asymmetric trust in the context of synchronous protocols for secure dis-
tributed computation by modeling process-specific fail-prone systems. They state the consistency prop-
erty of asymmetric Byzantine quorums and claim (without proof) that the B3 property is required for
implementing a synchronous broadcast protocol in this setting (cf. Section 4.2). However, they do not
formalize quorum systems nor discuss asynchronous protocols.
The Ripple consensus protocol is run by an open set of validator nodes. The protocol uses votes,
similar to standard consensus protocols, whereby each validator only communicates with the validators
in its UNL. Each validator chooses its own UNL, which makes it possible for anyone to participate, in
principle, similar to proof-of-work blockchains. Early literature suggested that the intersection of the
UNLs for every two validators should be at least 20% of each list [24], assuming that also less than one
fifth of the validators in the UNL of every node might be faulty. An independent analysis by Armknecht
et al. [3] later argued that this bound must be more than 40%. A recent technical paper of Chase and
MacBrough [9, Thm. 8] concludes, under the same assumption of f < n/5 faulty nodes in every UNL
of size n, that the UNL overlap should actually be at least 90%.
However, the same paper also derives a counterexample to the liveness of the Ripple consensus
protocol [9, Sec. 4.2] as soon as two validators don’t have “99% UNL overlap.” By generalizing the
example, this essentially means that the protocol can get stuck unless all nodes have the same UNL.
According to the widely shared understanding in the field of distributed systems, though, a protocol
needs to satisfy safety and liveness because achieving only one of these properties is trivial. Chase and
MacBrough therefore present a devastating verdict on the merit of Ripple’s protocol.
The Stellar consensus protocol (SCP) also features open membership and lets every node express its
own set of trusted nodes [20]. Generalizing from Ripple’s flat lists of unique nodes, every node declares
a collection of trusted sets called quorum slices, whereby a slice is “the subset of a quorum convincing
one particular node of agreement.” A quorum in Stellar is a set of nodes “sufficient to reach agreement,”
defined as a set of nodes that contains one slice for each member node. The quorum choices of all nodes
together yield a federated Byzantine quorum systems (FBQS). The Stellar white paper states properties
of FBQS and protocols that build on them. However, these protocols do not map to known protocol
primitives in distributed computing.
Garcı´a-Pe´rez and Gotsman [12] build a link from FBQS to existing quorum-system concepts by
investigating a Byzantine reliable broadcast abstraction in an FBQS. They show that the federated voting
protocol of Stellar [20] is similar to Bracha’s reliable broadcast [4] and that it implements a variation
of Byzantine reliable broadcast on an FBQS for executions that contain, additionally, a set of so-called
intact nodes.
The paper [12], however, uses the FBQS concept of Mazie`res [20] that is at odds with the usual
notion of a Byzantine quorum system in the sense that it does not reduce to a symmetric quorum system
for symmetric trust choices. In contrast, we show in this paper that a natural extension of a symmetric
Byzantine quorum system suffices for implementing various protocol primitives with asymmetric trust.
We explain, in particular, how to implement the prominent register abstraction with asymmetric trust and
investigate multiple broadcast primitives. In particular, Stellar’s federated voting protocol and the Byzan-
tine reliable broadcast over an FBQS as described by Garcı´a-Pe´rez and Gotsman [12], can be shown as
straightforward generalizations of Byzantine reliable broadcast with symmetric trust. Section 5.4, fur-
thermore, discusses why FBQS are not adequate for emulating a shared register.
3 System model
Processes. We consider a system of n processes P = {p1, . . . , pn} that communicate with each other.
The processes interact asynchronously with each other through exchanging messages. The system itself
is asynchronous, i.e., the delivery of messages among processes may be delayed arbitrarily and the
processes have no synchronized clocks. Every process is identified by a name, but such identifiers are not
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made explicit. A protocol for P consists of a collection of programs with instructions for all processes.
Protocols are presented in a modular way using the event-based notation of Cachin et al. [5].
Functionalities. A functionality is an abstraction of a distributed computation, either a primitive that
may be used by the processes or a service that they will provide. Every functionality in the system is
specified through its interface, containing the events that it exposes to protocol implementations that may
call it, and its properties, which define its behavior. A process may react to a received event by changing
their state and triggering further events.
There are two kinds of events in an interface: input events that the functionality receives from other
abstractions, typically to invoke its services, and output events, through which the functionality delivers
information or signals a condition a process. The behavior of a functionality is usually stated through a
number of properties or through a sequential implementation.
We assume there is a low-level functionality for sending messages over point-to-point links between
each pair of processes. In a protocol, this functionality is accessed through the events of “sending a
message” and “receiving a message”. Point-to-point messages are authenticated, delivered reliably, and
output in FIFO order among processes [14, 5].
Executions and faults. An execution starts with all processes in a special initial state; subsequently
the processes repeatedly trigger events, react to events, and change their state through computation steps.
Every execution is fair in the sense that, informally, processes do not halt prematurely when there are
still steps to be taken or events to be delivered (see the standard literature for a formal definition [18]).
A process that follows its protocol during an execution is called correct. On the other hand, a faulty
process may crash or even deviate arbitrarily from its specification, e.g., when corrupted by an adver-
sary; such processes are also called Byzantine. We consider only Byzantine faults here and assume for
simplicity that the faulty processes fail right at the start of an execution.
Idealized digital signatures. A digital signature scheme provides two operations, signi and verifyi.
The invocation of signi specifies a process pi and takes a bit string m ∈ {0, 1}∗ as input and returns
a signature σ ∈ {0, 1}∗ with the response. Only pi may invoke signi. The operation verifyi takes a
putative signature σ and a bit string m as parameters and returns a Boolean value with the response. Its
implementation satisfies that verifyi(σ,m) returns TRUE for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and m ∈ {0, 1}∗ if and
only if pi has executed signi(m) and obtained σ before; otherwise, verifyi(σ,m) returns FALSE. Every
process may invoke verify.
4 Asymmetric Byzantine quorum systems
4.1 Symmetric trust
Quorum systems are well-known in settings with symmetric trust. As demonstrated by many applications
to distributed systems, ordinary quorum systems [21] and Byzantine quorum systems [19] play a crucial
role in formulating resilient protocols that tolerate faults through replication [8]. A quorum system
typically ensures a consistency property among the processes in an execution, despite the presence of
some faulty processes.
For the model with Byzantine faults, Byzantine quorum systems have been introduced by Malkhi and
Reiter [19]. This notion is defined with respect to a fail-prone system F ⊆ 2P , a collection of subsets
of P , none of which is contained in another, such that some F ∈ F with F ⊆ P is called a fail-prone
set and contains all processes that may at most fail together in some execution [19]. A fail-prone system
is the same as the basis of an adversary structure, which was introduced independently by Hirt and
Maurer [15].
A fail-prone system captures an assumption on the possible failure patterns that may occur. It speci-
fies all maximal sets of faulty processes that a protocol should tolerate in an execution; this means that a
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protocol designed for F achieves its properties as long as the set F of actually faulty processes satisfies
F ∈ F∗. Here and from now on, the notation A∗ for a system A ⊆ 2P , denotes the collection of all
subsets of the sets in A, that is, A∗ = {A′|A′ ⊆ A,A ∈ A}.
Definition 1 (Byzantine quorum system [19]). A Byzantine quorum system for F is a collection of sets
of processes Q ⊆ 2P , where each Q ∈ Q is called a quorum, such that the following properties hold:
Consistency: The intersection of any two quorums contains at least one process that is not faulty, i.e.,
∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q,∀F ∈ F : Q1 ∩Q2 6⊆ F.
Availability: For any set of processes that may fail together, there exists a disjoint quorum in Q, i.e.,
∀F ∈ F : ∃Q ∈ Q : F ∩Q = ∅.
The above notion is also known as a Byzantine dissemination quorum system [19] and allows a pro-
tocol to be designed despite arbitrary behavior of the potentially faulty processes. The notion generalizes
the usual threshold failure assumption for Byzantine faults [22], which considers that any set of f pro-
cesses are equally likely to fail.
We say that a set system T dominates another set system S if for each S ∈ S there is some T ∈ T
such that S ⊆ T [11]. In this sense, a quorum system for F is minimal whenever it does not dominate
any other quorum system for F .
Similarly to the threshold case, where n > 3f processes overall are needed to tolerate f faulty ones
in many Byzantine protocols, Byzantine quorum systems can only exist if not “too many” processes fail.
Definition 2 (Q3-condition [19, 15]). A fail-prone system F satisfies the Q3-condition, abbreviated as
Q3(F), whenever it holds
∀F1, F2, F3 ∈ F : P 6⊆ F1 ∪ F2 ∪ F3.
In other words, Q3(F) means that no three fail-prone sets together cover the whole system of pro-
cesses. A Qk-condition can be defined like this for any k ≥ 2 [15].
The following lemma considers the bijective complement of a process set S ⊆ 2P , which is defined
as S = {P \ S|S ∈ S}, and turns F into a Byzantine quorum system.
Lemma 1 ([19, Theorem 5.4]). Given a fail-prone system F , a Byzantine quorum system for F exists if
and only if Q3(F). In particular, if Q3(F) holds, then F , the bijective complement of F , is a Byzantine
quorum system.
The quorum system Q = F is called the canonical quorum system of F . According to the duality
between Q and F , properties of F are often ascribed to Q as well; for instance, we say Q3(Q) holds if
and only ifQ3(F). However, note that the canonical quorum system is not always minimal. For instance,
if F consists of all sets of f  n/3 processes, then each quorum in the canonical quorum system has
n−f members, but also the family of all subsets of P with dn+f+12 e < n−f processes forms a quorum
system.
Core sets. A core set C for F is a minimal set of processes that contains at least one correct process in
every execution. More precisely, C ⊆ P is a core set whenever (1) for all F ∈ F , it holds P \F ∩C 6= ∅
(and, equivalently, C 6⊆ F ) and (2) for all C ′ ( C, there exists F ∈ F such that P \ F ∩ C ′ = ∅ (and,
equivalently, C ′ ⊆ F ). With the threshold failure assumption, every set of f + 1 processes is a core set.
A core set system C is the minimal collection of all core sets, in the sense that no set in C is contained in
another. Core sets can be complemented by survivor sets, as shown by Junqueira et al. [16]. This yields
a dual characterization of resilient distributed protocols, which parallels ours using fail-prone sets and
quorums.
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4.2 Asymmetric trust
In our model with asymmetric trust, every process is free to make its own trust assumption and to express
this with a fail-prone system. Hence, an asymmetric fail-prone system F = [F1, . . . ,Fn] consists of an
array of fail-prone systems, where Fi denotes the trust assumption of pi. One often assumes pi 6∈ Fi
for practical reasons, but this is not necessary. This notion has earlier been formalized by Damga˚rd et
al. [10].
Definition 3 (Asymmetric Byzantine quorum system). An asymmetric Byzantine quorum system for F
is an array of collections of sets Q = [Q1, . . . ,Qn], where Qi ⊆ 2P for i ∈ [1, n]. The set Qi ⊆ 2P is
called the quorum system of pi and any set Qi ∈ Qi is called a quorum (set) for pi. It satisfies:
Consistency: The intersection of two quorums for any two processes contains at least one process for
which both processes assume that it is not faulty, i.e.,
∀i, j ∈ [1, n],∀Qi ∈ Qi,∀Qj ∈ Qj ,∀Fij ∈ Fi∗ ∩ Fj∗ : Qi ∩Qj 6⊆ Fij .
Availability: For any process pi and any set of processes that may fail together according to pi, there
exists a disjoint quorum for pi in Qi, i.e.,
∀i ∈ [1, n], ∀Fi ∈ Fi : ∃Qi ∈ Qi : Fi ∩Qi = ∅.
The existence of asymmetric quorum systems can be characterized with a property that generalizes
the Q3-condition for the underlying asymmetric fail-prone systems as follows.
Definition 4 (B3-condition). An asymmetric fail-prone system F satisfies the B3-condition, abbreviated
as B3(F), whenever it holds that
∀i, j ∈ [1, n],∀Fi ∈ Fi,∀Fj ∈ Fj , ∀Fij ∈ Fi∗ ∩ Fj∗ : P 6⊆ Fi ∪ Fj ∪ Fij
The following result is the generalization of Lemma 1 for asymmetric quorum systems; it was stated
by Damga˚rd et al. [10] without proof. As for symmetric quorum systems, we use this result and say that
B3(Q) holds whenever the asymmetric Q consists of the canonical quorum systems for F and B3(F)
holds.
Theorem 2. An asymmetric fail-prone system F satisfies B3(F) if and only if there exists an asymmetric
quorum system for F.
Proof. Suppose that B3(F). We let Q = [Q1, . . . ,Qn], where Qi = Fi is the canonical quorum system
of Fi, and show that Q is an asymmetric quorum system. Indeed, let Qi ∈ Qi, Qj ∈ Qj , and Fij ∈
Fi∗ ∩ Fj∗ for any i and j. Then Fi = P \ Qi ∈ Fi and Fj = P \ Qj ∈ Fj by construction, and
therefore, Fi ∪ Fj ∪ Fij 6= P . This means there is some pk ∈ P \ (Fi ∪ Fj ∪ Fij). This implies in turn
that pk ∈ Qi ∩Qj but pk /∈ Fij and proves the consistency condition. The availability property holds by
construction of the canonical quorum systems.
To show the reverse direction, let Q be a candidate asymmetric Byzantine quorum system for F
that satisfies availability and assume towards a contradiction that B3(F) does not hold. We show that
consistency cannot be fulfilled forQ. By our assumption there are sets Fi, Fj , Fij in F such that Fi∪Fj∪
Fij = P , which is the same as P \ (Fi ∪ Fj) ⊆ Fij . The availability condition for Q then implies that
there are sets Qi ∈ Qi and Qj ∈ Qj with Fi ∩Qi = ∅ and Fj ∩Qj = ∅. Now for every pk ∈ Qi ∩Qj it
holds that pk /∈ Fi ∪ Fj by availability and therefore pk ∈ P \ (Fi ∪ Fj). Taken together this means that
Qi ∩Qj ⊆ P \ (Fi ∪ Fj) ⊆ Fij . Hence, Q does not satisfy the consistency condition and the statement
follows.
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Kernels. Given a symmetric Byzantine quorum system Q, we define a kernel K as a set of processes
that overlaps with every quorum and that is minimal in this respect. Formally, K ⊆ P is a kernel of Q if
and only if
∀Q ∈ Q : K ∩Q 6= ∅
and
∀K ′ ( K : ∃Q ∈ Q : K ∩Q = ∅.
The kernel system K of Q is the set of all kernels of Q.
For example, under a threshold failure assumption where any f processes may fail and the quorums
are all sets of
⌈n+f+1
2
⌉
processes, every set of
⌊n−f+1
2
⌋
processes is a kernel.
The definition of a kernel is related to that of a core set in the sense that for a given maximal fail-
prone system F , in the sense that its canonical quorum systemQ = F is minimal, the kernel ofQ is the
same as the core-set system for F .
Asymmetric core sets and kernels. Let F = [F1, . . . ,Fn] be an asymmetric fail-prone system. An
asymmetric core set system C is an array of collections of sets [C1, . . . , Cn] such that each Ci is a core set
system for the fail-prone system Fi. We call a set Ci ∈ Ci a core set for pi.
Given an asymmetric quorum system Q for F, an asymmetric kernel system for Q is defined anal-
ogously as the array K = [K1, . . . ,Kn] that consists of the kernel systems for all processes in P with
respect to Q; a set Ki ∈ Ki is called a kernel for pi.
Naı¨ve and wise processes. The faults or corruptions occurring in a protocol execution with an under-
lying quorum system imply a set F of actually faulty processes. However, no process knows F and this
information is only available to an observer outside the system. With a traditional quorum system Q
designed for a fail-prone set F , the guarantees of a protocol usually hold as long as F ∈ F . Recall that
such protocol properties apply to correct processes only but not to faulty ones.
With asymmetric quorums, we further distinguish between two kinds of correct processes, depending
on whether they considered F in their trust assumption or not. Given a protocol execution, the processes
are therefore partitioned into three types:
Faulty: A process pi ∈ F is faulty.
Naı¨ve: A correct process pi for which F 6∈ Fi∗ is called naı¨ve.
Wise: A correct process pi for which F ∈ Fi∗ is called wise.
The naı¨ve processes are new for the asymmetric case, as all processes are wise under a symmetric
trust assumption. Protocols for asymmetric quorums cannot guarantee the same properties for naı¨ve
processes as for wise ones, since the naı¨ve processes may have the “wrong friends.”
Guilds. If too many processes are naı¨ve or even fail during a protocol run with asymmetric quorums,
then protocol properties cannot be ensured. A guild is a set of wise processes that contains at least
one quorum for each member; its existence ensures liveness and consistency for typical protocols. This
generalizes from protocols for symmetric quorum systems, where the correct processes in every execu-
tion form a quorum by definition. (A guild represents a group of influential and well-connected wise
processes, like in the real world.)
Definition 5 (Guild). Given a fail-prone system F, an asymmetric quorum systemQ for F, and a protocol
execution with faulty processes F , a guild G for F satisfies two properties:
Wisdom: G is a set of wise processes:
∀pi ∈ G : F ∈ Fi∗.
Closure: G contains a quorum for each of its members:
∀pi ∈ G : ∃Qi ∈ Qi : Qi ⊆ G.
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Superficially a guild seems similar to a “quorum” in the Stellar consensus protocol [20], but the
two notions actually differ because a guild contains only wise processes and Stellar’s quorums do not
distinguish between naı¨ve and wise processes.
Observe that for a specific execution, the union of two guilds is again a guild, since the union consists
only of wise processes and contains again a quorum for each member. Hence, every execution with a
guild contains a unique maximal guild Gmax.
Example. We define an example asymmetric fail-prone system FA on P = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5}. The
notation Θnk(S) for a set S with n elements denotes the “threshold” combination operator and enumerates
all subsets of S of cardinality k. W.l.o.g. every process trusts itself. The diagram below shows fail-prone
sets as shaded areas and the notation nk in front of a fail-prone set stands for k out of the n processes in
the set.
FA:
F1 = Θ41({p2, p3, p4, p5})
F2 = Θ41({p1, p3, p4, p5})
F3 = Θ21({p1, p2}) ∗Θ21({p4, p5})
F4 = Θ41({p1, p2, p3, p5})
F5 = {{p2, p4}}
2
1
4
1
4
1
2
1
4
1
F1
F2
F3
F4
F5
p2 p3 p4 p5p1
The operator ∗ for two sets satisfies A ∗ B = {A ∪B|A ∈ A, B ∈ B}.
As one can verify in a straightforward way,B3(FA) holds. LetQA be the canonical asymmetric quo-
rum system for FA. Note that since FA contains the fail-prone systems of p3 and p5 that permit two faulty
processes each, this fail-prone system cannot be obtained as a special case of Θ51({p1, p2, p3, p4, p5}).
When F = {p2, p4}, for example, then processes p3 and p5 are wise and p1 is naı¨ve.
5 Shared memory
This section illustrates a first application of asymmetric quorum systems: how to emulate shared memory,
represented by a register. Maintaining a shared register reliably in a distributed system subject to faults is
perhaps the most fundamental task for which ordinary, symmetric quorum systems have been introduced,
in the models with crashes [13] and with Byzantine faults [19]. After presenting definitions and two
protocols to implement a register with asymmetric quorums, this section also explains why federated
Byzantine quorum systems according to Stellar [20] fail to directly emulate shared memory.
5.1 Definitions
Operations and precedence. For the particular shared-object functionalities considered here, the pro-
cesses interact with an object Λ through operations provided by Λ. Operations on objects take time and
are represented by two events occurring at a process, an invocation and a response. The history of an
execution σ consists of the sequence of invocations and responses of Λ occurring in σ. An operation is
complete in a history if it has a matching response.
An operation o precedes another operation o′ in a sequence of events σ, denoted o <σ o′, whenever o
completes before o′ is invoked in σ. A sequence of events pi preserves the real-time order of a history σ if
for every two operations o and o′ in pi, if o <σ o′ then o <pi o′. Two operations are concurrent if neither
one of them precedes the other. A sequence of events is sequential if it does not contain concurrent
operations. An execution on a shared object is well-formed if the events at each process are alternating
invocations and matching responses, starting with an invocation.
Semantics. A register with domain X provides two operations: write(x), which is parameterized by
a value x ∈ X and outputs a token ACK when it completes; and read, which takes no parameter for
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invocation but outputs a value x ∈ X upon completion.
We consider a single-writer (or SW) register, where only a designated process pw may invoke write,
and permit multiple readers (or MR), that is, every process may execute a read operation. The register
is initialized with a special value x0, which is written by an imaginary write operation that occurs be-
fore any process invokes operations. We consider regular semantics under concurrent access [17]; the
extension to other forms of concurrent memory, including an atomic register, proceeds analogously.
It is customary in the literature to assume that the writer and reader processes are correct; with
asymmetric quorums we assume explicitly that readers and writers are wise. We illustrate below why
one cannot extend the guarantees of the register to naı¨ve processes.
Definition 6 (Asymmetric Byzantine SWMR regular register). A protocol emulating an asymmetric
SWMR regular register satisfies:
Liveness: If a wise process p invokes an operation on the register, p eventually completes the operation.
Safety: Every read operation of a wise process that is not concurrent with a write returns the value
written by the most recent, preceding write of a wise process; furthermore, a read operation of a
wise process concurrent with a write of a wise process may also return the value that is written
concurrently.
5.2 Protocol with authenticated data
In Algorithm 1, we describe a protocol for emulating a regular SWMR register with an asymmetric
Byzantine quorum system, for a designated writer pw and a reader pr ∈ P . The protocol uses data
authentication implemented with digital signatures. This protocol is the same as the classic one of
Malkhi and Reiter [19] that uses a Byzantine dissemination quorum system and where processes send
messages to each other over point-to-point links. The difference lies in the individual choices of quorums
by the processes and that it ensures safety and liveness for wise processes.
In the register emulation, the writer pw obtains ACK messages from all processes in a quorum Qw ∈
Qw; likewise, the reader pr waits for a VALUE message carrying a value/timestamp pair from every
process in a quorum Qr ∈ Qr of the reader.
The function highestval(S) takes a set of timestamp/value pairs S as input and outputs the value in the
pair with the largest timestamp, i.e., v such that (ts, v) ∈ S and ∀(ts′, v′) ∈ S : ts′ < ts∨(ts′, v′) = (ts, v).
Note that this v is unique in Algorithm 1 because pw is correct. The protocol uses digital signatures,
modeled by operations signi and verifyi, as introduced earlier.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 emulates an asymmetric Byzantine SWMR regular register.
Proof. First we show liveness for wise writer pw and reader pr, respectively. Since pw is wise by as-
sumption, F ∈ Fw∗, and by the availability condition of the quorum system there is Qw ∈ Qw with
F ∩ Qw = ∅. Therefore, the writer will receive sufficiently many [ACK] messages and the write will
return. As pr is wise, F ∈ Fr∗, and by the analogous condition, there is Qr ∈ Qr with F ∩Qr = ∅. Be-
cause pw is correct and by the properties of the signature scheme, all responses from processes pj ∈ Qr
satisfy the checks and read returns.
Regarding safety, it is easy to observe that any value output by read has been written in some preced-
ing or concurrent write operation, and this even holds for naı¨ve readers and writers. This follows from
the properties of the signature scheme; read verifies the signature and outputs only values with a valid
signature produced by pw.
We now argue that when both the writer and the reader are wise, then read outputs a value of either
the last preceding write or a concurrent write and the protocol satisfies safety for a regular register. On
a high level, note that F ∈ Fw∗ ∩ Fr∗ since both are wise. So if pw writes to a quorum Qw ∈ Qw and
pr reads from a quorum Qr ∈ Qr, then by consistency of the quorum system Qw ∩Qr 6⊆ F because pw
and pr are wise. Hence, there is some correct pi ∈ Qw ∩Qr that received the most recently written value
from pw and returns it to pr.
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Algorithm 1 Emulation of an asymmetric SWMR regular register (process pi).
State
wts: sequence number of write operations, stored only by writer pw
rid: identifier of read operations, used only by reader
ts, v, σ: current state stored by pi: timestamp, value, signature
upon invocation write(v) do // only if pi is writer pw
wts← wts + 1
σ←$ signw(WRITE‖w‖wts‖v)
send message [WRITE,wts, v, σ] to all pj ∈ P
wait for receiving a message [ACK] from all processes in some quorum Qw ∈ Qw
upon invocation read do // only if pi is reader pr
rid← rid + 1
send message [READ, rid] to all pj ∈ P
wait for receiving messages [VALUE, rj , tsj , vj , σj ] from all processes in some Qr ∈ Qr such that
rj = rid and verifyw(σj ,WRITE‖w‖ts‖vj)
return highestval({(tsj , vj)|j ∈ Qr}
upon receiving a message [WRITE, ts′, v′, σ′] from pw do // every process
if ts′ > ts then
(ts, v, σ)← (ts′, v′, σ′)
send message [ACK] to pw
upon receiving a message [READ, r] from pr do // every process
send message [VALUE, r, ts, v, σ] to pr
Example. We show why the guarantees of this protocol with asymmetric quorums hold only for wise
readers and writers. Consider QA from the last section and an execution in which p2 and p4 are faulty,
and therefore p1 is naı¨ve and p3 and p5 are wise. A quorum for p1 consists of p1 and three processes
in {p2, . . . , p5}; moreover, every process set that contains p3, one of {p1, p2} and one of {p4, p5} is a
quorum for p3.
We illustrate that if naı¨ve p1 writes, then a wise reader p3 may violate safety. Suppose that all correct
processes, especially p3, store timestamp/value/signature triples from an operation that has terminated
and that wrote x. When p1 invokes write(u), it obtains [ACK] messages from all processes except p3.
This is a quorum for p1. Then p3 runs a read operation and receives the outdated values representing
x from itself (p3 is correct but has not been involved in writing u) and also from the faulty p2 and p4.
Hence, p3 outputs x instead of u.
Analogously, with the same setup of every process initially storing a representation of x but with
wise p3 as writer, suppose p3 executes write(u). It obtains [ACK] messages from p2, p3, and p4 and
terminates. When p1 subsequently invokes read and receives values representing x, from correct p1 and
p5 and from faulty p2 and p4, then p1 outputs x instead of y and violates safety as a naı¨ve reader.
Since the sample operations are not concurrent, the implication actually holds also for registers with
only safe semantics.
5.3 Double-write protocol without data authentication
This section describes a second protocol emulating an asymmetric Byzantine SWMR regular register.
In contrast to the previous protocol, it does not use digital signatures for authenticating the data to the
reader. Our algorithm generalizes the construction of Abraham et al. [1] and also assumes that only a
finite number of write operations occur (FW-termination). Furthermore, this algorithm illustrates the use
of asymmetric core set systems in the context of an asymmetric-trust protocol.
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Algorithm 2 Double-write emulation of an asymmetric SWMR regular register (process pi).
State
wts: sequence number of write operations, stored only by writer pw
rid: identifier of read operations, used only by reader
pts, pv, ts, v: current state stored by pi: pre-written timestamp and value, written timestamp and value
upon invocation write(v) do // only if pi is writer pw
wts← wts + 1
send message [PREWRITE,wts, v] to all pj ∈ P
wait for receiving a message [PREACK] from all processes in some quorum Qw ∈ Qw
send message [WRITE,wts, v] to all pj ∈ P
wait for receiving a message [ACK] from all processes in some quorum Qw ∈ Qw
upon invocation read do // only if pi is reader pr
rid← rid + 1
send message [READ, rid] to all pj ∈ P
upon receiving a message [VALUE, rj , ptsj , pvj , tsj , vj ] from pj such that // only if pi is reader pr
rj = rid ∧
(
ptsp = tsp + 1 ∨ (pts, pv) = (ts, v)
)
do
readlist[j]← (ptsj , pvj , tsj , vj)
if there exist ts∗, v∗, a core set Cr ∈ Cr for pr, and a quorum Qr ∈ Qr for pr such that
Cr ⊆
{
pk|readlist[k] = (ptsk, pvk, tsk, vk)} ∧
(
(ptsk, pvk) = (ts
∗, v∗) ∨ (tsk, vk) = (ts∗, v∗)
)}
and
Qr =
{
pk|readlist[k] = (ptsk, pvk, tsk, vk)
∧ ((tsk < ts∗) ∨ (ptsk, pvk) = (ts∗, v∗) ∨ (tsk, vk) = (ts∗, v∗))} then
return v∗
else
send message [READ, rid] to all pj ∈ P
upon receiving a message [PREWRITE, ts′, v′] from pw such that ts′ = pts + 1 ∧ pts = ts do
(pts, pv)← (ts′, v′)
send message [PREACK] to pw
upon receiving a message [WRITE, ts′, v′] from pw such that ts′ = pts ∧ v′ = pv do
(ts, v)← (ts′, v′)
send message [ACK] to pw
upon receiving a message [READ, r] from pr do
send message [VALUE, r, pts, pv, ts, v] to pr
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Theorem 4. Algorithm 2 emulates an asymmetric Byzantine SWMR regular register, provided there are
only finitely many write operations.
Proof. We first establish safety when the writer pw and the reader pr are wise. In that case, F ∈ Fw∗ ∩
Fr∗. During in a write operation, pw has received PREACK and ACK messages from Qw ∈ Qi and
Q′w ∈ Qi, respectively, and for all Qr ∈ Qr it holds that Qw ∩Qr 6⊆ F and Q′w ∩Qr 6⊆ F .
We now argue that any pair (ts∗, v∗) returned by pr was written by pw either in a preceding or a
concurrent write. From the condition on the core set Cr and (ts∗, v∗) it follows that at least one correct
process exists in Cr that stores (ts∗, v∗) as a pre-written or as a written value. Thus, the pair was written
by pw before.
Next we argue that for every completed write(v∗) operation, in which pw has sent [WRITE,wts, v∗],
and for any subsequent read operation that selects (ts∗, v∗) and returns v∗, it must hold wts ≤ ts∗.
Namely, the condition on Qr implies that ts∗ ≥ tsk for all pk ∈ Qr. By the consistency of the quorum
system, it holds that Q′w ∩ Qr 6⊆ F , so there is a correct process p` ∈ Q′w ∩ Qr that has sent ts` to pr.
Then ts∗ ≥ ts` ≥ wts follows because the timestamp variable of p` only increases.
The combination of the above two paragraphs implies that for read operations that are not concurrent
with any write, the pair (ts∗, v∗) chosen by read was actually written in the immediately preceding write.
If the read operation occurs concurrently with a write, then the pair (ts∗, v∗) chosen by read may also
originate from the concurrent write. This establishes the safety property of the SWMR regular register.
We now show liveness. First, if pw is wise, then there exists a quorum Qw ∈ Qw such that Qw ∩
F = ∅. Second, any correct process will eventually receive all [PREWRITE,wts, v] and [WRITE,wts, v]
messages sent by pw and process them in the correct order by the assumption of FIFO links. This means
that pw will receive [PREACK] and [ACK] messages, respectively, from all processes in one of its quorums,
since at least the processes in Qw will eventually send those.
Liveness for the reader pr is shown under the condition that pr is wise and that the read operation
is concurrent with only finitely many write operations. The latter condition implies that there is one last
write operation that is initiated, but does not necessarily terminate, while read is active.
By the assumption that pw is correct and because messages are received in FIFO order, all messages
of that last write operation will eventually arrive at the correct processes. Notice also that pr simply
repeats its steps until it succeeds and returns a value that fulfills the condition. Hence, there is a time
after which all correct processes reply with VALUE messages that contain pre-written and written times-
tamp/value pairs from that last operation. It is easy to see that there exist a core set and a quorum for pr
that satisfy the condition and the reader returns. In conclusion, the algorithm emulates an asymmetric
regular SWMR register, where liveness holds only for finitely many write operations.
5.4 SWMR register emulation with a federated Byzantine quorum system
As stated in Section 2, Stellar’s consensus protocol introduces federated Byzantine quorum systems
(FBQS) for expressing flexible trust. Each process specifies a set of quorum slices, which are subsets
ofP . When process “hears such a quorum slice of processes assert a statement, it assumes no functioning
process will ever contradict that statement” [20].
Consider then the example of a tiered quorum system that serves to explain FBQS [20, Fig. 3]: It
consists of three tiers:
• A top tier with processes p1, p2, p3, p4. The slices for pi (with i = 1, . . . , 4) are all sets of three
out of the four processes that contain pi as well.
• At a middle tier, the slices for processes p5, p6, p7, p8 consist of the process itself plus any two
processes of the top tier.
• The bottom tier with processes p9, p10. A slice for pi ∈ {p9, p10} contains pi and two nodes of the
middle tier.
Suppose one uses this FBQS in a protocol like Algorithm 1, by interpreting a quorum for pr and pw,
respectively, as one of their respective quorum slices. The resulting protocol would violate the satisfy
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of the register because p5, say, acting as the writer of a value u might have received ACK messages
from {p1, p2, p5} only and terminate. Processes p3 and p4 store a previously written value x and would
respond to a reader p8 with x 6= u. As these processes form a quorum slice {p3, p4, p8} for p8, it would
read x. This implies either that new, different protocols are needed for a register emulation with FBQS,
or that the FBQS concept is not appropriate for generalizing the established notions.
6 Broadcast
This section shows how to implement two broadcast primitives tolerating Byzantine faults with asym-
metric quorums. Recall from the standard literature [14, 8, 5] that reliable broadcasts offer basic forms of
reliable message delivery and consistency, but they do not impose a total order on delivered messages (as
this is equivalent to consensus). The Byzantine broadcast primitives described here, consistent broadcast
and reliable broadcast, are prominent building blocks for many more advanced protocols.
With both primitives, the sender process may broadcast a message m by invoking broadcast(m);
the broadcast abstraction outputs m to the local application on the process through a deliver(m) event.
Moreover, the notions of broadcast considered in this section are intended to deliver only one message
per instance. Every instance has a distinct (implicit) label and a designated sender ps. With standard
multiplexing techniques one can extend this to a protocol in which all processes may broadcast messages
repeatedly [5].
Byzantine consistent broadcast. The simplest such primitive, which has been called (Byzantine) con-
sistent broadcast [5], ensures only that those correct processes which deliver a message agree on the
content of the message, but they may not agree on termination. In other words, the primitive does not en-
force “reliability” such that a correct process outputs a message if and only if all other correct processes
produce an output. The events in its interface are denoted by c-broadcast and c-deliver.
The change of the definition towards asymmetric quorums affects most of its guarantees, which hold
only for wise processes but not for all correct ones. This is similar to the definition of a register in
Section 5.
Definition 7 (Asymmetric Byzantine consistent broadcast). A protocol for asymmetric (Byzantine)
consistent broadcast satisfies:
Validity: If a correct process ps c-broadcasts a messagem, then all wise processes eventually c-deliver m.
Consistency: If some wise process c-delivers m and another wise process c-delivers m′, then m = m′.
Integrity: For any messagem, every correct process c-delivers m at most once. Moreover, if the sender
ps is correct and the receiver is wise, then m was previously c-broadcast by ps.
The following protocol is an extension of “authenticated echo broadcast” [5], which goes back to
Srikanth and Toueg [25]. It is a building block found in many Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols with
greater complexity. The adaptation for asymmetric quorums is straightforward: Every process considers
its own quorums before c-delivering the message.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 3 implements asymmetric Byzantine consistent broadcast.
Proof. For the validity property, it is straightforward to see that every correct process sends [ECHO,m].
According to the availability condition for the quorum system Qi of every wise process pi and because
F ⊆ Fi for some Fi ∈ Fi, there exists some quorum Qi for pi of correct processes that echo m to pi.
Hence, pi c-delivers m.
To show consistency, suppose that some wise process pi has c-delivered mi because of [ECHO,mi]
messages from a quorumQi and another wise pj has received [ECHO,mj ] from all processes inQj ∈ Qj .
By the consistency property of Q it holds Qi ∩Qj 6⊆ F ; let pk be this process in Qi ∩Qj that is not in
F . Because pk is correct, pi and pj received the same message from pk and mi = mj .
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Algorithm 3 Asymmetric Byzantine consistent broadcast protocol with sender ps (process pi)
State
sentecho← FALSE: indicates whether pi has sent ECHO
echos← [⊥]N : collects the received ECHO messages from other processes
delivered← FALSE: indicates whether pi has delivered a message
upon invocation c-broadcast(m) do
send message [SEND,m] to all pj ∈ P
upon receiving a message [SEND,m] from ps such that ¬sentecho do
sentecho← TRUE
send message [ECHO,m] to all pj ∈ P
upon receiving a message [ECHO,m] from pj do
if echos[j] = ⊥ then
echos[j]← m
upon exists m 6= ⊥ such that {pj ∈ P|echos[j] = m} ∈ Qi and ¬delivered do
delivered← TRUE
output c-deliver(m)
The first condition of integrity is guaranteed by using the delivered flag; the second condition holds
because because the receiver is wise, and therefore the quorum that it uses for the decision contains some
correct processes that have sent [ECHO,m] with the message m they obtained from ps according to the
protocol.
Example. We illustrate the broadcast protocols using a six-process asymmetric quorum system QB ,
defined through its fail-prone system FB . In FB , as shown below, for p1, p2, and p3, each process always
trusts itself, some other process of {p1, p2, p3} and one further process in {p1, . . . , p5}. Process p4 and
p5 each assumes that at most one other process of {p1, . . . , p5} may fail (excluding itself). Moreover,
none of the processes p1, . . . , p5 ever trusts p6. For p6 itself, the fail-prone sets consist of p1 and one
process of {p2, p3, p4, p5}.
FB:
F1 = Θ32({p2, p4, p5}) ∗ {{p6}}
F2 = Θ32({p3, p4, p5}) ∗ {{p6}}
F3 = Θ32({p1, p4, p5}) ∗ {{p6}}
F4 = Θ41({p1, p2, p3, p5}) ∗ {{p6}}
F5 = Θ41({p1, p2, p3, p4}) ∗ {{p6}}
F6 = {{p1}} ∗Θ41({p2, p3, p4, p5})
3
2
3
2
3
2
4
1
4
1
F1
F2
F3
F4
F6
p2 p3 p4 p6p1 p5
F5
4
1
It is easy to verify that B3(FB) holds; hence, let QB be the canonical quorum system of FB . Again,
there is no reliable process that could be trusted by all and QB is not a special case of a symmetric
threshold Byzantine quorum system. With F = {p1, p5}, for instance, processes p3 and p6 are wise, p2
and p4 are naı¨ve, and there is no guild.
Consider an execution of Algorithm 3 with sender p∗4 and F = {p∗4, p∗5} (we write p∗4 and p∗5 to denote
that they are faulty). This means processes p1, p2, p3 are wise and form a guild because {p1, p2, p3} is a
quorum for all three; furthermore, p6 is naı¨ve.
p1 : [ECHO, x]→ P p1 : c-deliver(x)
p2 : [ECHO, u]→ P p2 : no quorum of [ECHO] in Q2
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p3 : [ECHO, x]→ P p3 : no quorum of [ECHO] in Q3
p∗4 :
{
[SEND, x]→ p1, p3
[SEND, u]→ p2, p6
p∗4 :
{
[ECHO, x]→ p1
[ECHO, u]→ p6
p∗5 :
{
[ECHO, x]→ p1
[ECHO, u]→ p6
p6 : [ECHO, u]→ P p6 : c-deliver(u)
Hence, p1 receives [ECHO, x] from {p1, p3, p∗4, p∗5} ∈ Q1 and c-delivers x, but the other wise processes
do not terminate. The naı¨ve p6 gets [ECHO, u] from {p2, p∗4, p∗5, p6} ∈ Q6 and c-delivers u 6= x.
Byzantine reliable broadcast. In the symmetric setting, consistent broadcast has been extended to
(Byzantine) reliable broadcast in a well-known way to address the disagreement about termination
among the correct processes [5]. This primitive has the same interface as consistent broadcast, except
that its events are called r-broadcast and r-deliver instead of c-broadcast and c-deliver, respectively.
A reliable broadcast protocol also has all properties of consistent broadcast, but satisfies the addi-
tional totality property stated next. Taken together, consistency and totality imply a notion of agreement,
similar to what is also ensured by many crash-tolerant broadcast primitives. Analogously to the earlier
primitives with asymmetric trust, our notion of an asymmetric reliable broadcast, defined next, ensures
agreement on termination only for the wise processes, and moreover only for executions with a guild.
Also the validity of Definition 7 is extended by the assumption of a guild. Intuitively, one needs a guild
because the wise processes that make up the guild are self-sufficient, in the sense that the guild contains a
quorum of wise processes for each of its members; without that, there may not be enough wise processes.
Definition 8 (Asymmetric Byzantine reliable broadcast). A protocol for asymmetric (Byzantine) re-
liable broadcast is a protocol for asymmetric Byzantine consistent broadcast with the revised validity
condition and the additional totality condition stated next:
Validity: In all executions with a guild, if a correct process ps c-broadcasts a message m, then all
processes in the maximal guild eventually c-deliver m.
Totality: In all executions with a guild, if a wise process r-delivers some message, then all processes in
the maximal guild eventually r-deliver a message.
The protocol of Bracha [4] implements reliable broadcast subject to Byzantine faults with symmetric
trust. It augments the authenticated echo broadcast from Algorithm 3 with a second all-to-all exchange,
where each process is supposed to send READY with the payload message that will be r-delivered. When
a process receives the same m in 2f + 1 READY messages, in the symmetric model with a threshold
Byzantine quorum system, then it r-delivers m. Also, a process that receives [READY,m] from f + 1
distinct processes and has not yet sent a READY chimes in and also sends [READY,m]. These two steps
ensure totality.
For asymmetric quorums, the conditions of a process pi receiving f + 1 and 2f + 1 equal READY
messages, respectively, generalize to receiving the same message from a kernel for pi and from a quorum
for pi. Intuitively, the change in the first condition ensures that when a wise process pi receives the
same [READY,m] message from a kernel for itself, then this kernel intersects with some quorum of
wise processes. Therefore, at least one wise process has sent [READY,m] and pi can safely adopt m.
Furthermore, the change in the second condition relies on the properties of asymmetric quorums to
guarantee that whenever some wise process has r-delivered m, then enough correct processes have sent
a [READY,m] message such that all wise processes eventually receive a kernel of [READY,m] messages
and also send [READY,m].
Applying these changes to Bracha’s protocol results in the asymmetric reliable broadcast protocol
shown in Algorithm 4. Note that it strictly extends Algorithm 3 by the additional round of READY
messages, in the same way as for symmetric trust. For instance, when instantiated with the symmetric
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Algorithm 4 Asymmetric Byzantine reliable broadcast protocol with sender ps (process pi)
State
sentecho← FALSE: indicates whether pi has sent ECHO
echos← [⊥]N : collects the received ECHO messages from other processes
sentready← FALSE: indicates whether pi has sent READY
readys← [⊥]N : collects the received READY messages from other processes
delivered← FALSE: indicates whether pi has delivered a message
upon invocation r-broadcast(m) do
send message [SEND,m] to all pj ∈ P
upon receiving a message [SEND,m] from ps such that ¬sentecho do
sentecho← TRUE
send message [ECHO,m] to all pj ∈ P
upon receiving a message [ECHO,m] from pj do
if echos[j] = ⊥ then
echos[j]← m
upon exists m 6= ⊥ such that {pj ∈ P|echos[j] = m} ∈ Qi and ¬sentready do // a quorum for pi
sentready← TRUE
send message [READY,m] to all pj ∈ P
upon exists m 6= ⊥ such that {pj ∈ P|readys[j] = m} ∈ Ki and ¬sentready do // a kernel for pi
sentready← TRUE
send message [READY,m] to all pj ∈ P
upon receiving a message [READY,m] from pj do
if readys[j] = ⊥ then
readys[j]← m
upon exists m 6= ⊥ such that {pj ∈ P|readys[j] = m} ∈ Qi and ¬delivered do
delivered← TRUE
output r-deliver(m)
threshold quorum system of n = 3f+1 processes, of which f may fail, then every set of f+1 processes
is a kernel.
In Algorithm 4, there are two conditions that let a correct pi send [READY,m]: either when receiving
a quorum of [ECHO,m] messages for itself or after obtaining a kernel for itself of [READY,m]. For the
first case, we say pi sends READY after ECHO; for the second case, we say pi sends READY after READY.
Lemma 6. In any execution with a guild, there exists a unique m such that whenever a wise process
sends a READY message, it contains m.
Proof. Consider first all READY messages sent by wise processes after ECHO. The fact that Algorithm 4
extends Algorithm 3 achieving consistent broadcast, combined with the consistency property in Defini-
tion 7 implies immediately that the lemma holds for READY messages sent by wise processes after ECHO.
For the second case, consider the first wise process pi which sends [READY,m′] after READY. From
the protocol it follows that all processes in some kernelKi ∈ Ki, which triggered pi to send [READY,m′],
have sent [READY,m′] to pi. Moreover, according to the definition of a kernel, Ki overlaps with all
quorums for pi. Since there exists a guild in the execution, at least one of the quorums for pi consists
exclusively of wise processes. Hence, some wise process pj has sent [READY,m′] to pi. But since pi
is the first wise process to send READY after READY, it follows that pj sent [READY,m′] after ECHO;
therefore, m′ = m from the proof in the first case. Continuing this argument inductively over all READY
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messages sent after READY by wise processes, in the order these were sent, shows that all those messages
contain m and establishes the lemma.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 4 implements asymmetric Byzantine reliable broadcast.
Proof. Recall that the validity property assumes there exists a guild G. Since the sender ps is correct and
according to asymmetric quorum availability, every wise process pi in G eventually receives a quorum
of [ECHO,m] messages for itself, containing the message m from ps. According to the protocol, pi
therefore sends [READY,m] after ECHO unless sentready = TRUE; if this is the case, however, pi has
already sent [READY,m] after READY as ensured by Lemma 6. Hence, every process in G eventually
sends [READY,m]. Then every process in G receives a quorum for itself of [READY,m] and r-delivers m,
as ensured by the properties of a guild and by the protocol.
To establish the totality condition, suppose that some wise process pi has r-delivered a message m.
Then it has obtained [READY,m] messages from the processes in some quorum Qi ∈ Qi. Consider any
other wise process pj . Since pi and pj are both wise, it holds F ∈ Fi∗ and F ∈ Fj∗, which implies
F ∈ Fi∗ ∩ Fj∗. Then, the set K = Qi \ F intersects every quorum of pj by quorum consistency
and is a kernel for pj by definition. Since K consists only of correct processes, all of them have sent
[READY,m] also to pj and pj eventually sends [READY,m] as well. This implies that all wise processes
eventually send [READY,m] to all processes. Every process in Gmax therefore receives a quorum for
itself of [READY,m] and r-delivers m, as required for totality.
The consistency property follows immediately from the preceding argument and from Lemma 6,
which implies that all wise processes deliver the same message.
Finally, integrity holds because of the delivered flag in the protocol and because of the argument
showing validity together with Lemma 6.
Example. Consider again the protocol execution withQB introduced earlier for illustrating asymmetric
consistent broadcast. Recall that F = {p∗4, p∗5}, the set {p1, p2, p3} is a guild, and p6 is naı¨ve. The start of
the execution is the same as shown previously and omitted. Instead of c-delivering x and u, respectively,
p1 and p6 send [READY, x] and [READY, u] to all processes:
. . . p1 : [READY, x]→ P p1 : r-deliver(x)
. . . p2 : no quorum p2 : [READY, x]→ P p2 : r-deliver(x)
. . . p3 : no quorum p3 : [READY, x]→ P p3 : r-deliver(x)
. . . p∗4 : −
. . . p∗5 : −
. . . p6 : [READY, u]→ P p6 : no quorum
Note that the kernel systems of processes p1, p2, and p3 areK1 = {{p1}, {p3}},K2 = {{p1}, {p2}},
and K3 = {{p2}, {p3}}. Hence, when p2 receives [READY, x] from p1, it sends [READY, x] in turn
because {p1} is a kernel for p2, and when p3 receives this message, then it sends [READY, x] because
{p2} is a kernel for p3.
Furthermore, since {p1, p2, p3} is the maximal guild and contains a quorum for each of its members,
all three wise processes r-deliver x as implied by consistency and totality. The naı¨ve p6 does not r-deliver
anything, however.
Remarks. Asymmetric reliable broadcast (Definition 8) ensures validity and totality only for processes
in the maximal guild. On the other hand, an asymmetric consistent broadcast (Definition 7) ensures
validity also for all wise processes. We leave it as an open problem to determine whether these guarantees
can also be extended to wise processes for asymmetric reliable broadcast and the Bracha protocol. This
question is equivalent to determining whether there exist any wise processes outside the maximal guild.
Another open problem concerns the conditions for reacting to READY messages in the asymmetric
reliable broadcast protocol. Already in Bracha’s protocol for the threshold model [4], a process (1)
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sends its own READY message upon receiving f + 1 READY messages and (2) r-delivers an output upon
receiving 2f + 1 READY messages. These conditions generalize for arbitrary, non-threshold quorum
systems to receiving messages (1) from any set that is guaranteed to contain at least one correct process
and (2) from any set that still contains at least one process even when any two fail-prone process sets
are subtracted. In Algorithm 4, in contrast, a process delivers the payload only after receiving READY
messages from one of its quorums. But such a quorum (e.g.,
⌈n+f+1
2
⌉
processes) may be larger than a
set in the second case (e.g., 2f + 1 processes). It remains interesting to find out whether this discrepancy
is necessary.
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